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Herodotus disentangled prose sufficiently from myth, setting Thu-
cydides a standard of comprehensiveness and purity that he could
better only by a more rigorous purity. If indeed Herodotus is included
in the nameless writers whose principles he abjures (I. 20-22), he
abjures not all of Herodotus, but rather, among other things, Her-
odotus' penchant for the exotic and for fails divers. Thucydides'
pejorative for him, tivdOibtc,, "story-like" or "mythy," can certainly be
stretched to cover Herodotus' sense. It is because he exercises a
somewhat loose control on particulars that with Herodotus, or those
like him, the details "prevail into the mythy."
Thucydides states, as he inserts his statement of principles between
the "Archaeology" and the account of the war, that he rests upon
inference {tekmerion),^ and also on inference with a rigorous linear
connection to his subject, "all inferential data in order" {travTl e^ijq
TeKnr]pio), literally, "every datum"). "All" points out explicitly that
every particular detail is sifted, taken with "inferential data." Taken
' A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1959- ), I, p. 135,
on 20. 1: "It should be remembered that TeKfiripiov is not evidence but the inference
drawn from the evidence." The rigor Thucydides marshalled when sifting evidence
for a particular fact shows, for example, in his use of Homer's authority for the
relation of the Greeks' early defenses to their later ones in the Trojan War, as Edwin
Dolin lucidly and complexly demonstrates ("Thucydides on the Trojan War: a Critique
of the Text of 1.1 1.1," Han>ard Studies m Classical Philology, 86 [1982], pp. 1 19-49).
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with "in order" it starts to remind us that Thucydides' focus will
shortly change and that everything he says will bear still more directly
on the war.
Writers who do not follow this recommended process may be poets
(TTOiTjTai), an activity that engages them in setting up another kind
of order: they write not e^riq but Koa/xovvTeq (21. 1), an "ordering"
that is at the same time an adorning, in a dead spatial metaphor that
implies a comprehensive "kosmos" and not a linear sequence. Poets
are here coupled with those whom the reader, after Herodotus had
written, and in the climate Havelock describes in Preface to Plato,^
might be tempted to distinguish from poets. These are the logographoi
or "prose writers," who also put their material into order. Their
procedure of doing so is designated by yet a different locution,
^vuedeaav, "put together." The three terms of ordering (e^^q, Koanovurec,,
^vvedeaav) align the three types of writers according to the principle
on which they organize their material. Thucydides is a fourth kind,
and it may be said that he here emphasizes testing his data rather
than ordering them himself because his ordering must evolve in the
long presentation he is beginning.
The Xoyoypa(f)OL "put together" their material, Thucydides says,
so as to be more attractive to the hearer—and the term "hearer"
assimilates them back to the more automatic persuasiveness of oral
reception. The term Trpoaayooyorepov, "more attractive of access,"
also comes close to a notion offails divers. They are "more attractive
than true," and Thucydides then returns in this passage to his single
explicit positive criterion, the checking of evidence, datum by datum.
It is, to be sure, by his account, a distance in time, and not in
space or in logical ordering, that will make presented data "prevail
with incredibility into the mythy" (airiffTouc, eirl to fivdccdeq eKuevLKrjKOTo).
The compound verb iKvePLKrjKOTa, which might also be rendered "win
over," indicates a dynamic process. The writer whom Thucydides
rejects gradually succumbs to a "mythy" element in his data by failing
to scrutinize them. As if in still fuller deference to what he has
articulated here, he couples his declaration in the next chapter, that
he has constructed or reconstructed the speeches on reliable evidence,
with the assertion that in any case they bear directly on the war. Both
of these statements may be taken as an implied rejection of Herodotus'
scope. Thucydides' term ^-qTrjinq, inquiry by scrutiny, steps up the
rigor of Herodotus' historia, "investigation," a term Thucydides wholly
2 Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).
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avoids using. ^ As for his initial look at events remote in time,
Thucydides has already shown them to bear directly on the factors
of the war. His opening is similar to Herodotus', except that Herodotus
begins almost at once with a narrative as a causal explanation.
Herodotus, after setting his theoretical premises briefly, at once begins
by sifting stories in the search of a single cause for the enmity between
Europe and Asia so as to account for the beginning of the Persian
War. He settles on a single particular, Croesus, "pointing out this one
man" {tovtov arjur^paq). It is from that vantage that he gets into his
narrative: "pointing out this one man I shall proceed into the further
presentation of my account" {eq to izpooo) tov Xbyov, I. 5).
Thucydides, by contrast, makes no attempt as he sets up his
background to make a particular datum carry the burden of his
general account. He stays on the plane of factorial semi-abstraction
until he reaches the point in time and space that immediately involves
his particular war, deferring even the fifty years preceding it, the
Pentekontaetia, till somewhat later. In the "Archaeology," though the
particular details are subject to the dimming and mythologizing
falsification of time, Thucydides has proceeded by what he calls "most
explicit signs" {einipaueaTaTitiv arintio^v), "sufficiently" {aTroxp<j^vT<jo<;,
21. 1). This final adverb suggests that in this instance he has contented
himself with something like a minimum of data, but after having
tested evidence that did prove testable. A sufficient condition has
been met for moving from particular to general. The signs were
"explicit"—for those who could test them. Again, if this is a revision
of Herodotus, it is still very much along Herodotus' lines, except for
the adjustment of particular to general, though it could be asserted
that Herodotus, even when he doubts, does not usually hint that
evidence is at a low state of verifiability. And the possibility here
implied by Thucydides, that evidence might somehow be at once
scanty and adequate for explicit reading, puts him in a diff^erent
realm from Herodotus by raising the criterion not just of verifiability
but of sufficiency {airoxp<j^fT(joq).
None of this is directly counter-mythological, though it works even
harder than Herodotus does the counter-mythological substructure
of its organizational principle. This principle tests a relation between
particular and general, whereas the myth is always easily both par-
ticular (Oedipus or Apollo) and general (man or god). Applying the
myth, as the poet does, requires intelligence but not testing. On the
contrary, the poet is free to invent within the outlines of his story, as
^ I have discussed the conditions implied by Herodotus' use of iaTopirj in Albert
Cook, Myth and Language (Bioomington, Indiana 1980), pp. 69-106.
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well as to emphasize some aspect of a known story. The historian
must establish the aspects of a story that has happened but that he
must coordinate from scratch. Plato strains his dialectic, as it were,
to restore myth's easy congruence between particular and general
without recourse to story, except as a supplement or as a movement
onto another plane. For Plato, connections between the planes,
between dialectic and myth, are left mysterious, and the philosopher's
enterprise is neither confined nor fully defined by story-bound pattern
types. The ideas are in heaven, but they are history-less, unlike either
men or gods.
None of this is exactly counter-mythological either. Thucydides is
of course still more negative than Plato on the uses of myth as a
factor in the progress of his main narrative. "Having prevailed into
the mythy," the abjured practice of others, suggests also for them an
intellectual process—one which logically could include Plato's—to
mediate that which has been allowed to become "mythy." Such a
softening of rigor would work against Thucydides' task-in-hand. "*
Thucydides leaves Herodotus' ethnographic inquiries almost wholly
behind. He does not need those particulars. He differs from Herodotus
more notably in that restriction than he does in his attitude towards
•
It is startling that Cornford (F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus [London
1907]) used this sentence as the epigraph for a work that then goes on effectually
to misread its strictures. With the benefit of modern thematic analysis we may make
the story of Pausanias (I. 129-35) conform to a mythic pattern, as Cornford does,
but Thucydides does not. Still less would he effectually capitalize onraTri as the goddess
"Deception" in the first events surrounding Alcibiades (V. 35 ff.).
For the overall "mythic" cast of the Peloponnesian War itself, Cornford offers a
convenient reference point to deny. This contemporary of Freud, as we may say, saw
in Thucydides' History a sort of return of the repressed. As everyone realizes, we
cannot seek the sense of this work in a crude equation of Athens' downfall through
v^pic, and arr) with that in Greek tragedy. Indeed, the formula does not work too
well for Greek tragedy either. Thucydides is not mythistoricus. For one thing the word
aTTj does not occur once in the whole of his work (A), and the six references to u/3pii;
are all limited to a very specific occasion. This is Thucydides'—and for that matter
the historian's—normal use of such abstractions, even though there is a slight poetic
cast to Thucydides' vocabulary (B). But whatever the dominant substratum we attribute
to Thucydides' narrative, the relation he establishes between particular and general
in his narrative radically divorces it from the procedures of myth-evocation.
(A) I have tried to deduce the implications of the exclusively poetic use of arri in
Albert Cook, Eyiactment: Greek Tragedy (Chicago 1971), pp. 69-76. For further
examination of the personal psychological implications of this complex word, see
William F. Wyatt, Jr., "Homeric Ate," American Journal of Philology 103 (1982), pp.
247-76.
(B) Dionysius of Halicarnassus was the first to notice the poetic cast of Thucydides'
vocabulary, which is also touched on by Gomme {op. cit., I, p. 235, note on ayav in
I. 75. 1). See also John J. Finley, Jr., Thucydides (Cambridge, Mass. 1942), p. 265.
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the gods.^ Thucydides does differ from Herodotus in addressing a
collective action that was going to be a failure rather than a success.
It was also going to transform the Greek world, for the time being,
much more radically that the larger-scale Persian conflicts did. Since
he could not have known these two large results when he set himself
the task of writing his history, his initial vantage could not have been
conditioned by Cornford's sense of a tragic sense in him. Still, it is
well to keep Cornford in mind, though at a distance, if we wish to
get a sense of how Thucydides, like his younger contemporary Plato,
took the tack of rejecting much previous discourse and much of the
previous conditions thereof, as an impetus for his own. In the
complicated dispute that he reports over the Athenians' drawing
water in sacred temple precincts when the Boeotians themselves
abstained (IV. 97-98), Thucydides intrudes no doubt about the many
factors implicit and explicit.^ One factor stated, indeed, is that the
Athenians and the Boeotians share the same gods (IV. 97. 4). Nor
does Thucydides question the myth of Tereus (II. 29) when he
distinguishes a different Tereus in the background of Sitalkes. He
actually provides the detail that poets have memorialized the night-
ingale incident, asserting in the same sentence that the distance
between the countries would make a closer origin plausible {^iKoq) for
the better-known Tereus. As the scholiast says, "It is significant that
here alone he introduces a myth in his book, and then in the process
of adjudication" (Sio-Toif^cof, literally "doubting").^ The significance
would lie not in confirming his rejection of myth,^ and still less in
his subordination to it, but rather in the austerity of a focus that
rarely allows a myth to obtrude. Still, in this one instance, the veracity
of a mythical past is used as a tool to sift facts; when he later brings
in the myth of Alcmaeon, it serves to define a region. Even a myth
will do as a focusing particular.
^ Though Herodotus is more explicit in this and other ways, the actual differences
between the two historians with respect to the gods are relatively minor. As Syme
points out, in Thucydides an appeal to the gods often fails (Ronald Syme, "Thucy-
dides," in the Proceedings of the British Academy 48 [1962], pp. 39-56, esp. p. 52). But
that is true in Herodotus as well, with the frequent elaborate mismatching of oracle
to circumstance.
^ Gomme, ad lac.
' Quoted in Gomme, II, p. 90, ad loc.
^ See also II. 15. 1, "in the time of Cecrops." As Gomme says (ad loc, II, p. 48),
"Another example to show that Thucydides did not doubt the truth, in outline, of
the Greek 'myths,' though he might interpret the story in his own way."
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In the reckoning of time and the marking of stages for his History,
Thucydides abstracts his work at once, demarcating time as related
just to his event-series; he numbers the years according to the war,
usually by summers and winters. "And the eleventh year ended for
the war," he says (V. 39). This particular time there is a tinge of
ironic emphasis in the statement, since it marks events after the
"Peace of Nicias" in 421. The flat statement works to keep his
progression relentlessly even. His movement forward implies a prior
reasoning: "If anyone were to doubt that the war continued just
because a much-broken treaty of truce was in force, I will use the
word war, as I did before, to characterize this particular year too."
Such sentences as "And the eleventh year ended for the war" place
a purely temporal mark on the event-series, coming as they do
regularly but unpredictably in the work, and sometimes with his own
name attached to them. Their neutrality reinforces their inexorability.
This writer of prose has left behind him the ambition of Herodotus
or of Ion of Chios. He can rest with his method, and with his verbal
means. The relation between oral and written is not a problem for
him, as it is posed in the Phaedrus of Plato and felt all through Plato's
work, or as it must have been for Heraclitus. Nor is Thucydides'
prose simply a convenient instrument, as for Lysias, Protagoras, and
the medical writers. Thoroughly grounded in his principle of testing,
Thucydides' written account can then re-include the oral, and spec-
tacularly, in the form of the complexly structured speeches of the
work. His principle of testing reassures him to the point where he
asserts he can reconstruct these speeches, if necessary, on the basis
of reports of what the main arguments would have been ("the way
each of them seemed to me to have spoken most likely what was
needed {to. deovra iiaXidT' eiirelp] about what the present situation
each time was," I. 22). Such a confidence implies that the oral, to be
congruent with the written and narrated, need not be poetic. The
memorable need not be poetic.
Plato's speeches, of course, are by contrast not remembered. They
are Active reports of conversations imagined to have taken place.
Plato's initial fiction corresponds to Thucydides' reality. Thucydides
asserts that in their essentials these speeches really did take place.
The essentials are points in an argument, which thereby and therewith
are put on a par with other historical happenings, the X67ot with the
epya—and in this passage he contrasts the two terms, words and
deeds. This pair remains a key duet of terms throughout his work.
The speeches show that a sequence of points in an argument is a
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sequence of constated particulars. The enchained generalities and
abstractions for which the speeches are notable actually attest to their
verifiability. The generalities guarantee that the particulars have been
tested by sifting.
What was spoken in the past, then, assimilates to, as well as assesses,
what was done in the past—so long as it is within the living attention
span of the writing historian.
This vision of the public experience arises from a new privacy of
the literary act. The philosopher, the poet, the tragedian, and even
the medical writer, had an audience defined somewhat by social sub-
grouping and personal contact, or else by a ritualized occasion. If
Heraclitus was a private writer, he would seem to have taught, and
he is said to have laid his book in the temple of Artemis. In carrying
out lessons before a band of faithful auditors, Socrates, and Plato
himself, conform to the pre-Socratic prototype for the thinker's
communication channels. The historian, however, from Hecataeus
on, is committed not only to prose but to the written book freed of
such social constraints. The exile of Thucydides here offers a literary
dimension as well as a vantage for research. He intensifies these
conditions. He has no immediate audience for his book, but a long
wait. And a certain randomness defines his potential readership; he
has no theatre or academy or group of poetry enthusiasts or ritual
throng or law court in which it will be taken up.
It is in the act of writing history that the comparatively free
audience-expectation of the modern book suddenly comes into ex-
istence.
Moreover, while Herodotus undergoes a comparable wait, and
compasses a long work in comparable privacy, he can expect some
national accolade from the very success of the Panhellenic effort he
so fully accounts for. There is a tradition that he read his work aloud
to general acclaim. As with Livy, there is an element of patriotism
in his history. Thucydides, however, resembles the gloomy Tacitus.
Even before the failure of the war, since as he in effect tells us he
set himself the task before knowing its outcome, his testing of factors
implies a neutrality towards the parties that has a sharper cutting
edge than Herodotus'. Thucydides' vision of public events, while
highly generalizable, is intensely private and personal, the more so
that its generalities are based not on a prior social code, and not
even on Herodotus' neutral ethnographic stance, but on the writer's
principle of inference as it governs the enunciation of factors. Thu-
cydides proposes no community, as Plato does, and in a sense he does
not himself describe a community, though he lets others do so.
Brasidas is as noble as Pericles, and there is more in his actions than
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the specifically Spartan. Instead, Thucydides provides a basis in action
for the principles on which community rests, though unlike Machia-
velli he does not turn explicitly to such questions. The high degree
of communal energy that characterizes Athens in Pericles' Funeral
Oration, on the evidence, is a momentary increment from the
prosperity whose evolution is described in the Archaeology and the
Pentekontaetia. As Schadewaldt says, Thucydides "indicates general
horizons for events {das Geschehen) and carries within himself a mode
of the theory of categories. Both aspects determine the picture
Thucydides offers us ... in tension with each other."^
The social implications of the "achievement laid up forever," the
KTrina iq aui, lodge Thucydides in a lonely universality, even though
KTTina in its regular Homeric and post-Homeric sense suggests personal
use in a social context. Looking personally backwards, his events have
to have been lived through in order to have validity, and they must
be tested in order to have general relevance. Looking ahead, their
effectiveness is indifferent with respect to the group that might be
imagined as consulting the History.
Yet in one sense Thucydides is conservative and by implication
community-minded. His narrative concentrates on military history,
to as great a degree as the Iliad does. In this Thucydides is closer to
Homer than Herodotus was. For the military hero that a poet
celebrates, too, the poem is a perpetuation of his fame to generations
that might otherwise forget, as Pindar reminds us. The poem, too,
is a KTTifia iq aui. What Thucydides memorializes, however, are events
not only unique but also explicitly patterned and exemplary. So are
Homer's events, to be sure, but the poet, in his social role at least,
seems to be organizing the pattern to enhance the uniqueness, whereas
for Thucydides it is the other way around. Homer already took the
giant step of transforming the sort of battle frieze to be seen on
Mycenean reliefs, late geometric vases, and later on classical pedi-
ments. He transformed this persistent Near Eastern celebratory focus
on awesome clashes by setting organizational principles over the clash.
Thucydides goes Homer one better by abstracting these, but clashes
are still far more particularized in his history than the clashes in
Herodotus. Thucydides is a military historian to the degree that the
coherence of so striking a cultural tribute as the Funeral Oration
becomes a problem for the interpreter.
Thucydides' concentration on military operations also throws them
^ Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Die Anj'dnge der Geschichtsschreibung bei den Griechen
(Frankfurt 1982), pp. 251-52.
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into perspective through the touching in of power motives, the more
strikingly that the military is so preponderant.
In depicting military events, Thucydides is linear, but also expan-
sive. The same thorny problem-states—Thebes, Corinth, Corcyra,
Potidaea, Platea, Mytilene, Amphipolis, Syracuse—keep turning their
thorns to the event. A complex particular moves in time towards
generality. Yet in the imposition of power considerations, Thucydides'
view seems to be at once cyclical and general. The same factors keep
applying; the course from inception of campaign or attack to reso-
lution keeps taking place. He demonstrates the fact that failure or
success may not be clear, and he is consequently careful to point out
those occasions when both sides claim victory. In Thucydides the
word "circle," KmXoq, is always just spatial, though he uses the verb
KVKXov/jiaL in a way that combines the linear and the cyclical. The
verb implies making linear progress in getting past something by
using a circling movement.
If we cannot press the buried metaphors in Thucydides so far, the
sense he creates of constant ratiocination invites us to look for it in
his very diction.
The war is involved uninterruptedly, though with unpredictable
particular variations, in a forward linear flow. Thucydides shows it
at every point gathering up, and pulling against, assumptions and
causes—to such a degree that defining his use of terms such as
acTLa ("cause") and -Kpo^aoLc, ("pretext") entails intricate comparisons
and discriminations. '° In Herodotus the large, understood forces
pause, as it were, for stocktaking. In Thucydides they never rest from
their dynamic interaction. The spreading pool of ignorance about
the past that Thucydides stresses can be taken to imply some ignorance
about the present. And ignorance, signally the Athenian ignorance
about the complexity of politics in Sicily, operates itself as a factor,
dynamically. The speeches exhibit the tension, and the syntactic
intricacy, of trying to construct present-oriented rationales for specific
behaviors. This is true even of Pericles' Funeral Oration (II. 35-46).
Its high abstractions and graceful definitions are aimed toward the
propaganda purpose of boosting morale; Pericles' opening backward
look at the past superiority of Athens is adduced as a factor in giving
the Athenians an extra edge in the coming conflicts. Pericles ends
the speech in a well-nigh Hitlerian injunction to replace the dead
'" Gomme, I, p. 153; II, pp. 154-55.
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soldiers with living children who may grow up to fight for Athens
(II. 44. 3).
Still, there remains always such a surplus of factors and emphases
that they get out of hand—not counting such natural disasters as the
plague, which follows very soon after this oration. It brings about
still more deaths, deaths that only most tangentially can be connected
to the war. The multiplicity of factors jerks the linear flow ahead, as
is shown in pairs or larger groups of speeches—the normal case. A
second speaker will show this as against the first speaker, by his
reliance on inevitably diff"erent emphases and possibly different fac-
tors, even when the geopolitical assumptions are the same. The
speeches show general and particular in the process of refocusing
their relations.
Such is the pressure from many quarters that events tend to outrun
Thucydides' linear account of them. Often something has happened
which his unavoidable focus at one point has kept out of his narrative
in its proper sequence. Occasionally, and revealingly, he violates strict
chronological order." So, in a specific instance, the very relaxedness
that a new peace implies, and the necessity to realign forces once
they are not firmly marshalled against one another, leaves participants
in a position of overreaching themselves through an inevitable inca-
pacity to cover all the factors. This is the case at the beginning, when
Athens incurs the wrath of Sparta by trying to manage forces at the
perimeter of her league. It is the case after the peace of Nicias once
again, when in 420 many states—Argos and its confederacy, the
Athenians and Alcibiades personally, the Boeotians, the Corinthians,
the Megarians, and the Spartans—all re-expose themselves by ne-
gotiations in more than one direction.
Those Spartans "who most wanted to dissolve the treaty" (V. 36)
—
thus calling into play the factor of internal factionalism, as Alcibiades
will soon effectually do—secretly urge the Boeotians and the Cor-
inthians first to ally themselves with Argos (and its allies), and then
subsequently with Sparta. This project, if it were to be actualized, as
often in Thucydides, would kill two birds with one stone for these
hostile Spartans: it would offend the Athenians by violating the
condition of the truce that no new alliances be formed, and by
forming them it would strengthen Sparta. However, on their way
home the Boeotians (V. 37) encounter, again privately, some Argives
who are waiting there for the purpose of urging the very same
alliance; persuasion is not necessary. Back home the rulers of Boeotia
" Ibid., I, p. 209, on I. 57. 6, with examples.
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endorse this policy, but the four councils that constitute the decision-
making group in Boeotia see it differently:
irplv bt Tovc, 5pK0vq yeveadai oi BoLU)Tapxoci tKoivoiaap ralq reaaapm fSovXatq
Tihv BoL(jiT<hv TavTa, aurep airav to Kvpoq e'xoucrij', /cat irocpffvovv yeveadai.
opKOvq TOiq TroXeaiv, ooai ^ovXourai tV (h(t)eXia acpiai ^vpoixvvvai. oi 8' Iv roCic,
PovXalq T(hv Boi(iiTU)u ovTeq ov irpoabexovrai top Xoyov, dedLoreq nrj ivavTia
KaKibaip,ovioLc, iroirjauai, Tolq eKeipu)u cecpeoTchaL Kopifdioiq ^vuoupvvTfq- ov yap
UTZov avTolq oi ^OLUTOcpxoit ra eK rfiq AaKebainovoq, on TCbv re i<f)bpoiv KXib^ovXoq
Koi 'EiPaprjq Kot oi (jAXoi Trapaivovaiv 'Apyeiwv izpCoTOv Koi Kopivdiicu yevofxfi^ovq
^vnp,axovq varepov fxera rcor AaKebaLiiodcj^v yiyveadai, oiOfxeuoi ttjj' 0ovXr]v,
Kocv fXT] a-Kicaiv, ovk aXXa \py)(t)iu<jdai, ri a acpiai irpobiayvopTeq irapaivomiv.
Icq bl avTiarr} to Trpayp.a, oi jxlv Kopiudioi Kal oi airb Qpq Krjq irpia^aq
onrpaKTOi airriXdou, oi be (SoiojTapxoii ntXXovTeq irpoTepov, a TavTa eireiaav, koi
Trjv ^vpfiaxioiu -rreipaaeadai irpbq 'Apydovq iroidv, ovk€ti iar]veyKav irepl
'Apydcou iq Taq ^ovXaq, ovbe iq to "Apyoq Tovq irpea^aq ovq VTziaxovTO eirenirov,
aixeXeia be Tiq evrjv kol btaTpi/Sfi tCjp iravTOiv.
Before these oaths could be carried out with Corinthian, Megarian,
and Thracian envoys, the Boeotian rulers publicized these events to
the four councils of the Boeotians, who carry the whole authority,
and advised them to carry out oaths with those cities who would wish
to swear a common oath for defense {dxpeXia). But those who were in
the Boeotian councils did not accept this rationale (Xbyop; also "speech").
They feared to act in opposition to the Spartans by swearing a common
oath with the Corinthians, who had defected from them. For the
Boeotian rulers did not tell the councils the events in Sparta, that
among the Ephors Kleoboulos, Xenares, and their friends had advised
alliances with the Argives and Corinthians to be carried out first and
then alliances with the Spartans. They thought that the councils in
deliberation (Lit., singular, iSovXrj), even if they did not tell them this,
would not vote otherwise than they themselves had determined be-
forehand and advised. But when the affair took a contrary position,
the ambassadors from Corinth and Thebes went off without success,
and the Boeotian rulers, who had previously intended, if they had
persuaded them of this, to try to make an alliance with the Argives
as well, no longer brought anything about the Argives before the
councils, nor did they send to Argos the ambassadors they had
promised, but there was a certain lack of care {aneXeia) and delay in
all these matters. (V. 38)
"Lack of care" and "delay" are constant threats in the tension
between the forward progress of events and the instability of factors
pressing upon them. And shortly, in fact, Alcibiades plays a double
game by courting both Sparta and Argos, which is itself playing the
double game of courting both Athens and Sparta. Alcibiades is actually
playing a triple game, because, by lying himself, he tricks the truthful
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Spartan envoys into looking like liars before the Athenian Assembly
(V. 44-45). But then another factor, one from the different realm of
natural catastrophes, supervenes over this already complicated situ-
ation. "But an earthquake occurring before anything had been
confirmed, this assembly was adjourned."
In the war a state is itself a complex factorial entity. The weight
or permanence of one such factorial entity—say Corcyra or Sicily
—
cannot be assessed in its magnitude of importance with relation to
that of another entity, until after the fact. Corcyra in the first place
could not have been assessed beforehand as incurring the set of
events that would place it at the center of the conflict between Athens
and Sparta over her handling of Epidamnus (I. 25-56), which drew
the Spartans' protesting attention and helped precipitate the huge
war. Four years and a vast complex of events later, this trouble spot,
as it turns out, re-erupts, and the same set of dominoes tumbles
against one another in a different order—Epidamnus-Corcyra-Cor-
inth-Athens—this time centering on the sort of internal struggle
between oligarchy and democracy (III. 69-85) that later develops as
a parallel threat to Athens itself. Corcyra is caught as an entity in a
linear sequence of power-events, whose unstable timing of recursion
in a stable repertoire of factors is guaranteed by the steadiness, and
the dynamism, among those factors. A census of the relevant factors
would include Corcyra's (or any other entity's) geographical distance
from a friendly or a hostile power, its relation to colonial ties, both
originally (Corcyra is a colony of Corinth) and as it develops (Epi-
damnus is a colony of Corcyra). Financial status, too, is an important
factor, stressed by Thucydides in the "Archaeology": the ability of a
state to translate its resources into an army, a navy, and defensive
installations. There are, further, the local political factions, and also
a state's prior relations to such more powerful entities as Athens or
Sparta, as well as the history of the state's prior role in the common
effort of the Persian War. A state's geography comes into play
somewhat differently, too, through its relation to war operations in
close or distant theatres, and even to holding operations on or near
its own terrain.
By adducing all these factors and at the same time often keeping
them implicit, Thucydides allows for their permutation, for the
subjection of their particular manifestation to the linear progression,
and also for their coordination into usually unstated generality. The
factors are never quiescent and never isolated, he implies—even
though his conception obliges him to be silent about them when, as
inevitably on these very grounds, his attention is drawn elsewhere.
The naivete of the Athenians in not seeing, and in not listening to
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Nicias about, the inevitable interplay of such factors on the large
Sicilian terrain, is implied by what has already been shown to bear
on the picture. If this is so with little Corcyra, all the more so with
huge Sicily. The roll-call of the Sicilian allegiances as they have shaped
up (VII. 57-58) carries with it an implied demonstration of how
force, racial ties, prior allegiances, prior colonial ties, and geographical
proximity all permute beyond the power of Athens to control them,
or even to influence them very much.
As against the interrelations of the political entities in Herodotus,
which happen pretty much on a binary or a ternary basis, those in
Thucydides permute in the face of a common but relentlessly evolving
situation that presses on each state diff^erently but on all alike. The
forces are, as it were, centripetal, in spite of the geographically
centrifugal relations—often across much water or over rugged moun-
tains—of the Greek states. The relations in Herodotus may be
themselves called centrifugal: a state, once it has solved a stress point,
is left to itself for a while in a stable condition. There is no general
center of common interest or high permutation of factors between
Persia and Ionia, or between Persia and Lydia. And for the big
conflict mainland Greece has pretty much been left out, except for
occasional consultations, until Persia turns by elimination in her
direction. State marriage in Herodotus (never except remotely in
space or time for Thucydides) may involve a number of state-groups,
as that of Astyages involves the Medes, the Persians, the Lydians, the
Scythians, the Cilicians, and the Babylonians (Herodotus I. 73-77).'^
But the factors are static, and separable. As these peoples go their
separate ways, or take up their places within the Persian Empire, they
tend to stay in place.
The speeches, either antithetical or propagandistic in character,
serve to externalize the counterpoise of forces in the History. Just so
the forces drawn up for conquest will meet either prevailing or
succumbing counter-forces. But then, whichever the case may be,
other forces will be operating against them. And the speeches are
oriented to the military action their own situation-orientation and
usually their antagonistic stance serve to mirror. The speeches address
the war; they are the speeches of those "either about to make war
or already in it" (I. 22).
This practical relation of the speeches to force, and their subjection
to force as in some ways just another manifestation of it, diff~erentiates
Thucydides from debaters in the law courts, from philosophers like
Protagoras and tragedians like Euripides, with whom he has been
'^ Albert Cook, Myth and Language, pp. 158-62.
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compared.'^ Any lawyer is less involved, any philosopher more
theoretical, any speaker in a tragedy more oriented to his own
subjective needs, than the speakers in the History. Even Alcibiades,
the most self-centered of his actors, must try to force a yield of
personal gain out of collocating unremittingly public factors. Those
are, therefore, the forces to which he addresses himself, like everybody
else in Thucydides. In this sense we can almost see the leaders in the
History bringing to bear upon events the critical view of the historian
himself. And, though he may not offer the abstract political science
of Machiavelli, he does indeed show a "latent systematization of
power."'* The generalities are always being tested, from the very first
sentence of the History, by the particulars held in a tension that
reveals the force organizing them.
In the History a speaker may be said to aim at an equilibrium, a
stability among factors. "Stable" {^e(3aLoq) is a favorite term of
Thucydides. He has Pericles say that the Spartans, as farmers, will
offer their bodies rather than their material resources {xpvuaTa),
because the latter "would not be stable against the possibility of being
exhausted" (I. 141. 5). The envoys of threatened Mytilene, speaking
at the Olympic banquet upon Sparta's urgency, speak of a "stable
friendship," while twice invoking aperr] in international relations.
They go on to say that if all states were independent, they themselves
would have been "more stable against innovating" (III. 10). In urging
death for the men of the rebel city, Cleon declares "the worst thing
of all is when nothing remains stable in what we are concerned
about" (III. 37. 3). Brasidas' excellence creates a "stable expectation"
that others will be like him (IV. 81. 3). In the upheavals and
proscriptions caused in 412 by the Four Hundred, a "stable mistrust"
is created (VIII. 66. 5).
Moreover, as these quotations illustrate, the term "stable" is applied
under the most diverse circumstances. There is no set of general
principles that would allow Thucydides to enunciate laws governing
stability. In military operations—and they are his subject—he may
give specific tactical rationales,'^ but he is not only silent, as Gomme
points out, about the relation of tactics to strategy. He must be silent,
except about specific factors at a given place and time, on the principles
we may deduce from the History. Especially is this the case in a
Panhellenic conflict taking place in what might be called a weak
'* See Finley, op. cit., pp. 46-70.
'* This is Schadewaldt's phrase, by way of qualifying Reinhardt's and Schwartz's
comparisons of Thucydides to Machiavelli.
'^ Gomme, I, p. 19.
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macro-system: Corcyra, Corinth, Potidea, Naupactus, Thebes, Samos,
Lesbos, Melos—to say nothing of the various Sicilian states—all are
subject, taken together, to an idiosyncratic congeries of factors, even
if the factors taken singly are the same. It is a stable fact that they
will be unstable, and variously unstable. The tension between general
and particular operates unpredictably in accordance with predictable
laws. The weak macro-system is balanced, by contrast, against what
might be called a micro-system that is stable or at least potentially
stable, based on the internal organization of a given state by itself,
whether small like Melos or large like Athens and Sparta. And the
event-moment in space and time—say the siege of Mytilene— is itself
a stable micro-system, rendered in turn unstable by the incursion of
other systems. This is borne out vividly by what Dover calls "the
complexity of classification" in the lineup of combatants before the
Sicilian conflict.'*'
Buildups have a tendency, as in this impressive one, to work up to
a grand slam of alliances. Since the kind of equilibrium which will
obtain at a given moment is unpredictable, in the linear progression
of the History the length and complexity of a buildup may be cut
short at any time. So in one among other earlier intrusions of Athens
into Sicilian affairs, twenty ships are sent in the summer of 427 to
aid Leontini against Syracuse; and then the Athenians establish
themselves at Rhegium. Thucydides reports this buildup right after,
and implicitly as a consequence of, the petering out of the Corcyrean
rebellion. He makes his transition by the lightest of contrasting
particles, a 5e. Such a hi introduces the next transition qualifying and
curtailing this buildup; the second plague in Athens; and then
earthquakes. Consequently it might be said—this time a niv marks
the transition—that the Athenians turn away from their original
purpose when they attack the islands off Sicily (III. 88), and unsuc-
cessfully. Then the following summer they do prevail at Mylae and
win Messina, other events intervening to give the buildup and
deployment a still further twist. Finally for this campaign they sail
from Sicily to Locris, an action they perform in implied concert with
a prior Athenian force there (III. 96-98), and become masters
{iKpoiT-qaav) of Locris. The whole final development is swift enough
to be recounted, as though by interrupted aftermath, in a single not
lengthy sentence (III. 99).
The balance between predictable factors and their unpredictable
development correlates with the principle governing the speeches,
'® A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on
Thucydides (Oxford 1970), IV, pp. 433-36, on VII. 57-59.
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which take up a fourth of Thucydides' text. Cornford makes the
distinction in the speeches between "infiguration," or fitting in what
is already known, and "invention," or adding new matter." As the
Corinthians say while pressing their case for war at the beginning,
"war least of all proceeds on specified conditions (fVi pr]Tolq), but
manages the many factors (to; iroXXa) of itself according to contingency
{TapcxTvyxavouy (I. 122).
This stated rule succeeds in a simultaneous declaration and ironic
qualification, a contradiction of effects it can embed because the
"contingency" can be predictable if seen for its factors or unpre-
dictable if seen for the impossibility of knowing what direction the
particular combination of their multiplicity (to: iroXXa) may take. The
Corinthians are in fact here revealing their ignorance and overcon-
fidence—traits which elsewhere in Thucydides, as here, accompany
bloodthirstiness. Here we have the curious mechanism of whistling
in the dark by calling the dark dark. The speeches are, in Schwartz's
words, "willed showpieces {Glanzleistungen) of his political-rhetorical
thinking."'* In them the intelligence of the historian converges with
the intelligence of the participants. He attains his pitch by assuming
they can rise to his intelligence on occasion. He envisages an intricacy
in their thought comparable to his own by putting it on the same
plane as his own. "Intelligence," ^vueaiq, is a special word for Thu-
cydides, and as he uses it the prefix, ^vv ("together") is active.'^ It is
an active intelligence, brought to bear on keeping particular events
open to the possibility of the sort of general subsumption that the
historian brings it to bear on his narrative. Twice Thucydides pairs
the term with aperri (IV. 81. 2; VI. 54. 5). Intelligence here allows
for the "reckoning by probability" {(LKa^eiv, eiKoq), and for an attempt
to avoid that "irrationality" (irapaXoyov) that characterizes human
life generally (VIII. 24. 5) and especially wars (III. 16; VIII. 24; II.
61). Intelligence is the chief safeguard against that which it cannot
reach to, the "unapparent" {to ci(l)aueq). The long range is distin-
guished from the short. It is only after his death, on a long range,
that the long range of Pericles' "foresight" becomes apparent. The
Spartans expect it to be the short war they have no firm grounds for
" Cornford, op. cit., p. 132.
'^ Eduard Schwartz, Das Geschkhtswerk des Thukydides, (repr. Hildesheim 1960), p.
27.
'^ See Walter Miiri, "Beitrag zum Verstandnis des Thukydides" (1947), in Hans
Herter, ed., Thukydides (Darmstadt 1968), pp. 135-69. Syme, op. cit., remarks on
Thucydides' predilection for the term. An expansive examination of this and related
"psychological" words is given in Pierre Huart, Le Vocabulaire de VAnalyse Psychologique
dans I'oeuvre de Thucydide (Paris 1968).
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conjecturing, thus expectation being against "good sense" or "the
best opinion" {-Kapa yv6inr}v, V. 14). Tvoi^r] is a term Thucydides uses
well over a hundred times, more than twice as many times as
Herodotus. In this term intelligence is conceived as an activated
natural faculty, often spoken of as "applied" (irpocrexft") to the
particulars of a situation.
Nicias, in the debate before the Sicilian expedition, declares that
his reasoned speech would be weak {aadeprjq 6 Xbyoq) if he did not
try to avoid speaking against his best opinion (VI. 9. 3). Pericles links
the possibility of stability to the active use of intelligence:
Overconfidence (aiTxrjM") can come about through lucky ignorance
even for a coward, but disdain is our resource who can rely on good
sense (yvc^nri) to prevail over our enemies. And under equal fortune
an intelligence {^vueaiq) on which his superiority of feeling depends
will provide a more tenacious daring; and it relies less on hope, which
is the strength of someone without resources, than it does on good
sense from the resources it has, a good sense whose foresight is more
stable. (II. 62. 4-5)
This complicated sentence at its conclusion comes down hard on
three key words: "good sense's more stable foresight," r}q (= yvoi^nriq)
(SelSaiorepa r] irp'ovoia. Mere Hope, eX-jriq, is often given a pejorative
cast in Thucydides.
In the stylistic flow of Thucydides' own presentation, these defi-
nitions of the mind at work on events crop up with special saliency
in the speeches. They evidence a high self-consciousness in the
speakers. In the narrative they tend to cap a presentation, as
Regenbogen^° points out of the moment when the Athenian ships
are setting sail and "the foreigners and the rest of the crowd came
for the spectacle as to a conception {diauoia) that was sufficient [to
draw so large a crowd] and incredible" (VI. 31). The term I have
rendered "conception", diavoLa, is hard to translate here. Presumably
the unprecedentedly large fleet is visible evidence of a thought process
in the leaders of Athens. It is the result of thought, not thought
itself, the usual sense of diavoia. Thucydides has been consistently
proceeding at a level of factor-collocation that would justify the odd
transfer here from thought to what it produces. As for the crowd,
the sight is "sufficient" to draw them {a^i,6xp^<^v), but at the same
time "incredible." The crowd has a somewhat easier thought process
than the leaders, that of wonder, and their reaction may be taken as
part of a cautionary series with the earlier dissuasions of Nicias and
the much earlier warnings of Pericles against such expeditions.
^" Otto Regenbogen, Kleine Schriften (Munich 1961).
40 Illinois Classical Studies, X.l
In his repeated corrections about the overthrow of the Pisistratidae
(I. 20; VI. 54-59), Thucydides uses a particular fact, the distinction
between Hippias and Hipparchus, as the thread which will provide
the proper sequence for an interactive situation. "Factual accuracy,"
Edmunds emphasizes, "is not the sufficient condition for history in
the Thucydidean sense, but only the necessary condition for to (Ta(t)ec,"
("that which is clear"). ^' The rebels from Mytilene use the same term
during a summary moment of their defense at Olympia: "Possessing
such demonstrable grounds {Kpo(j)aa€iq) and motives {airiac^, O Spar-
tans and allies, we revolted; they are clear enough to make our
hearers know {yvihvat) that we have acted in accordance with sound
inference (fi/coTcoq)" (III. 13). Here, actually, the term "clear" is an
adjective, <ja<t>dc„ applied to two terms themselves intricate, separately
and in relation to each other, Trpo(f)aaeLq and airiac,. Further, aa^xlq
here gathers up and organizes a whole interlocking set of intellections:
the lengthy ones of the Mytileneans, the inference of the Spartans
and their allies, and the Mytileneans' thought that what they have
thought will make the Spartans and their allies think {yv^uai) they
have carried out their thought on sound inferential grounds (eiKOTOoq).
Nathan Rotenstreich speaks of "a paradox implicit in historical
knowledge. This knowledge is always causal, yet it is not based on
material laws."^^ Thucydides works his way steadily and alertly through
this paradox. "Pretext" is a more ordinary sense of irpoipaaLC, in
Greek^^ and "cause" of airto;. Taking the terms that way, they would
provide a ladder of certainty for the principals in the History. But
they cannot be taken just that way. The ladder is always collapsing
because the situation changes so radically and frequently as to suggest
at once the inadequacy of these intellections and the presence of
some force of the same type beyond the reach of summary, though
comprised of the same factors. For all their alertness, the Mytileneans
do not extricate themselves. Nor in the whole History do the Athenians
either. Later, replying to the Athenian claim that the weak go to the
wall (V. 89), the Melians enunciate Thucydidean principles, "It is
useful for you not to dissolve the common good, but for what is
sound (eLKora) to be also just for the one who from time to time finds
himself in danger; and for one who is persuasive, even when what
he says is somewhat short of accuracy (aKpi^eia), to be able to have
the advantage of them" (V. 90). Still they are massacred.
^' Lowell Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge, Mass. 1975),
p. 155.
^^ Nathan Rotenstreich, Between Past and Present (New Haven 1958), p. 296.
^^ See note 12 and Albert Cook, The Classic Line (Bloomington, Indiana 1966),
pp. 70-71.
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"Everything that has to do with war is difficult," Hermocrates tells
the Sicilians (IV. 59). Archidamus says much the same thing to the
Spartans, "Things having to do with war are unclear" (adrfXa, II.
11. 4). Gomme observes that the reflection is a recurrent one in the
History,^'^ and Thucydides, from the beginning, adduces the terms
"clear" and "unclear" as alternate characterizations for the disposi-
tions of particular events.
The elusive factors bear impersonally on states, but it is men who
personally make the decisions that activate them. The contrast be-
tween factors and persons, brought to a head in Thucydides' method,
carries within it at once a permanent disparity and a perilous reso-
lution. Such a contrast is another aspect of the oscillation between
clarity and its opposite. Men are generalizing particulars in a particular
situation governed by general factors. Thus is a comparable inter-
action in Herodotus made dynamic. Resolution into clarity, in a sense,
always bears on the situation Thucydides depicts, since the factors
can only be activated, and thereby raised as it were to the second
degree, by being taken up in the calculations of participants. After
the peace of Nicias, and on the heels of a calculated rapprochement
with Argos, the Spartan ambassadors who go to Boeotia decide to
return the Athenian prisoners they have been given and to announce
the razing of Panactum to the Athenians, who had been promised it
back (V. 42). The diff"erent interpretations put by the Athenians and
by the Spartan envoys upon this double announcement, and the
diff"erent weight given to each event, precipitate a hostility that
immediately opens a path for Alcibiades and his rivalry with Nicias
(V. 43).
Events, by their very nature as crystallizations of decisions, lead
to persons, and to particular kinds of persons. The Spartans may be
slow and the Athenians swift, as the Corinthians tell the Spartans (I.
70-71). However, the clarity, the resignation, and even the particular
brand of selfishness in Nicias, transcend national boundaries and
heavily qualify the notion that he is weak. Thucydides rarely expresses
estimates of his persons directly^^ and when he does so, he is, as it
were, assessing the man as by himself an extraordinary factor, as in
the praise of Themistocles (I. 138) or the cautionary words about
Alcibiades (VI. 15).
^* Gomme, II, p. 13, ad loc.
25 H. D. Westlake, Individuals m Thucydides (Cambridge 1968), p. 15.
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Leaders, in fact, under whatever form of government, are clearly
shown in Thucydides to determine initiatives. They manage the
forces to which in turn they cannot help being subject. These forces
include other leaders; Nicias loses to Alcibiades the debate over the
Sicilian expedition, and he reconciles himself to it, leading the
expedition. But then he is subject to another constraint on the lives
of statesmen. Unless they have the precocious gifts of an Alcibiades,
they will be along in years when at the helm. And war itself increases
the risks of mortality. Nicias suffers through the Sicilian expedition
and dies there, as Pericles had died and Archidamus, Demosthenes
and Brasidas, Phormio and Cleon.
Precocity brings with it another risk, which Alcibiades has come
to stand for more than anyone else, the risk of brilliant narcissism.
He might trick the Spartan envoys, but over the long run a man's
character shows. It was inevitable, whatever his guilt, that he would
be accused of the sacrilege against the herms and the Mysteries.
Thucydides underscores this inevitability by giving us insufficient
evidence to decide his guilt either way, where usually it is accuracy
in just this sort of affair that he seeks. The fact that Alcibiades is
accused, as he inevitably would have been, impels this rapid and
adaptive politician to avoid probable death by fleeing when the
Athenians send to have him returned for trial. Other Athenians had
fled to avoid prosecution, not always so successfully. And later
Alcibiades repeats this success, slipping away from a Spartan death
sentence to the entourage of Tissaphernes. He would inevitably be
using his talents to intrigue with the Persians and with the Spartans.
And through the irony of developments he escapes the disastrous
Sicilian campaign he had urged, contriving his way back finally into
the good graces of the Athenians.
The forces, at every point, are there to be managed, and the very
change of their configuration from present moment to present
moment provides a clever man with the opportunity to take them
up without necessarily being impaired by the way he had done so
before. Finally Alcibiades' selfishness and skill at diplomacy come
into their own under the conditions that prevail after the Sicilian
disaster, in the eighth book. This, as Westlake reminds us, is "packed
with reports of secret negotiations and intrigues."^**
The disintegration of the Athenian empire provides a decentrali-
zation of forces that permits playing one force against another without
effective checks. In this way the person of Alcibiades, at this moment
in the war, functions doubly as an agent upon the factors and as a
^^ Ibid., p. 231.
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mirror of where they stand. Indeed, the very mode by which agency
combines with mirroring will differ. Pericles' particular bearing on
the general situation is resumed into the speeches that exhibit him.
These speeches exemplify a particular phase of the war and serve as
agencies to influence a particular kind of policy—or not to influence,
since they are partially unheeded." "When he died his foresight
about the war was still further recognized" (II. 65). For Nicias, and
for the dark events around Syracuse, the man and the time are
characterized first by a reasoned speech not forceful enough to
prevail, and finally by the relative silence of desperate defensive
maneuvers. The individual in this instance would seem to have
developed under the pressure of circumstances, since at an earlier
moment Thucydides has asserted that Nicias urged the peace "to
leave a name to later time" (V. 16).
Thucydides' managed silences too, as Reinhardt and Schadewaldt
have emphasized,^® preserve that neutrality. "What [your] nature
always willed has been tested to the point of truth" (III. 64. 4: a
. . . i\ (f)vcnc, aul i^ovXero) are in the Greek plural and particular. The
literal meaning is "The things which your nature always wished."
The wish is general, and the truth is singular, a generalizing abstraction
{to aXr]6€(;). So the Boeotians say to the Plataeans, but the notion will
apply to the whole History. Most of Thucydides' uses of 0ucri(; "nature"
mean "human nature." And of the twenty times he uses (f)V(nq,
"human" or its equivalent is attached in nine. This quality, however,
is not taken for granted, nor does it operate on the surface. It must
be "tested to the truth" by the participants, and overridingly by
Thucydides himself, whose History constitutes such a testing.
Nor is war a special case. "Many difliculties (ttoXXq; Kal x^^ctto;)
fell upon the cities in the uprising," he says of the Corcyrean
Revolution, "occurring and always bound to occur so long as the
nature of man is the same, though more peaceful and changing in
their forms according to how the particular transformations of events
{^vvTVxi-o)v) may impinge {e(t)i.(TT<huTaLy' (III. 82. 2). "For all things by
their nature (7re0uKf) do indeed diminish" (II. 64. 3), Pericles reminds
the Athenians at the moment when he is assuring them that the glory
of their empire will survive in memory. Nature, necessity {apajKr}),
and customary behavior {to eioodoq) are linked in his presentation.^^
Thucydides' neutrality extends even to the presentation of himself
^^ See Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New
York 1980), and Gomme, II, p. 195.
2* Schadewaldt, op. cit., p. 301, and Gomme, 1, pp. 25-29; also Karl Reinhardt,
Das Vermdchtnis der Antike (Gottingen 1960).
29 Walter Muri, op. cit., pp. 155 ff.
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in the third person both as a writer and as a participant (IV. 104. 4),
and it is significant that in his "second preface" Thucydides adopts
for a few sentences the grammatical sleight of an imagined, neutral
observer. "If someone does not consider the intervening truce to be
accounted war, he will not judge rightly. Let him look to how it is
discriminated by the events, and he will find it not a likely thing
{ovK eUbq ov) for it to be assessed as peace" (V. 26. 2).
The elaborate negatives here, and the six different verbs for mental
sifting, establish, as though through syntactic struggle, the neutrality
of viewpoint that Thucydides everywhere aims at. A sense of the
severity with which he maintains this steadiness of view impends upon
this neutrality, and a sparkling clarity of presentation holds his details
in unwavering coordination. The neutrality heightens the relational
interaction between general and particular.
Many constraints bear on the historian's task generally, and some
obligation to preserve neutrality is one of them. Neutrality is the
attitudinal aspect of the obligation to narrate events "wie sie eigentlich
gewesen." Another constraint obliges him to report only facts he can
be reasonably sure were the case. This is Thucydides' "accuracy"
(aKpi^eta). Still another constraint obliges him to select them for some
kind of congruence to his purpose, as Thucydides is a military
historian. Another constraint inhibits the historian from avoiding a
mediation of his events, inducing him to adjudicate between general
and particular in any case. He is obliged to steer somewhat clear of
what could be taken for bare reportage. On the one hand he must
suspend judgment while suspending his long-range connections. On
the other hand mediation requires that he not give just a flat summary
of events; he must not simply offer a chronicle. The balance of
mediation obliges the historian to steer a constant middle course
between tract and chronicle. Thucydides not only understood this
requirement, as Herodotus had. The speeches offer him an indirect,
"doubled" mode of introducing interpretation while maintaining
neutrality.
In this sense he must hold to the narrative, and his skillful
management of all these constraints strengthens his narrative, allowing
it to take on details for which the necessity cannot be argued on any
logical framework. In the case of Thucydides, these details sometimes
stun through similarity; particulars worked on by a coordinating
intellection evolve into generality. The narrative of the Sicilian
campaign would presumably carry a comparable sense of the action
if it were divested of half its details, and yet the extra details, what
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I have elsewhere called "the visionary filler,"^" do not diffuse the
narrative, but rather sharpen it; the particulars function as cumulative
demonstration, and in the narrative mode a sense of their necessity
does not vanish once a general view is sensed.
In any case, before the investigation of the theoretician, the hard
outline of what we would call an "event" disappears. '' As Koselleck
argues, history "as such" has no object at all, a condition that makes
"bare history originally a metahistorical category."^^
Any historian is thus pulled in two directions by the particular and
by the general, and the mystery of his task resides in striking a
balance between them that will operate along a narrative line. As
Paul Ricoeur says, "it is the place of universals in a science of the
singular that is at issue,"^' though even the word "science" is
misleading here, since in the historical narrative hypothesis and
conclusion are fused together. There is a mix of the two in the
ongoing narrative that the historian mediates, and may mediate
differently within a given work. Particular and general have a different
relationship in the speeches of Thucydides^* and in the more directly
narrative portions. The speeches have a double role as explanatory
pauses establishing a general case, and as subsumed particulars globally
aligned with the details of action, along the lines of Thucydides'
constant distinction between X6701 and i.p^a, words and deeds.
Thucydides' statements about persons or events are briefer than
his narrative presentation of them. This seeming disproportion or
spareness of interpretation actually creates, together with the man-
agement of other constraints, a sense that a general view is being
gradually furthered. It permits Thucydides sharply to enunciate what
all successful historians must, the partial synecdoche that constitutes
his Kjr\\ia e'q aWi. Particular events have to have been selected for
some general aim for them not to be a chaotic mass. The selection
is partial even of those the historian can know—for Thucydides only
those that have not been inescapably lost in the dimness of time. As
'^ Albert Cook, Mjih and Language, pp. 178-83.
^' Paul Veyne, Comment on ecrit I'histoire (Paris 1971), pp. 18-38.
^^ Reinhart Koselleck, in Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft und Praxis des Geschichts-
unternchts, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart 1972), pp. 10-28.
" Paul Ricoeur, The Contribution of French Historiography to a Theory of History
(Oxford 1980), p. 19.
^^ N. G. L. Hammond, "The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches of
Thucydides," in The Speeches in Thucydides (Chapel Hill 1973), pp. 49-59. Aristotle
makes too facile a judgment about this relationship by a simple contrast between
poetry and history, "poetry tells us rather the universals, history the particulars"
{Poetics 1451 b 2-3). I have discussed this question in Myth and Language, p. 299, note
6.
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particulars they suggest a generality to which they relate; they are
inescapably synecdochic. But the synecdoche does not operate the
way it does in poetry; there is no whole for which the parts can
stand. The whole is only adumbrated, and the synecdoche remains
only partial, mediating perpetually between general and particular.
This mediation entails a sense of irony, and all or nearly all
successful historians are ironic in ways that are also partial. One event
is bound to throw another into an ironic light, or the historian offers
us just a chronicle. The overlooking of Pericles' advice, the escape
of Alcibiades from the war he had urged, the fruitlessness of the
articulations of the Melians to save their lives, the failure of the
overweening Athenians in Sicily—the ironies of event multiply in
Thucydides, who rarely makes an out-and-out ironic remark. Some
irony in the historical narrative is unavoidable through the initial
chaos of the referent, and yet an overall irony is impossible if the
historian retains the order of the referent as a goal. The ironies play
over the work as a sort of multiple running check against sliding
back to mere particulars or against wholly backing some oversimpli-
fying generality that would undo the tension of the narrative. The
interpretative touch of ironic statement in later historians such as
Tacitus or Gibbon or Burckhardt will jog the narrative along. Thu-
cydides, we may say, shows his earliness in the intensity by which he
stiffly refrains, by and large, from such touches.
The speeches, again, serve to double the ironic possibilities, not
only between event and event, but between what is said and what
happens, between Xbyoc, and epyov. Any speech, as a complex of
ratiocinative recommendations aimed at the future, is bound to be
tested by that future, and bound to miss its mark somewhat, generating
the implied irony of contrast. And even if the speech hits its mark,
there is the irony that still the speech may not be heeded, as Nicias'
speech is not. There is generally an impelling onward movement
toward conquest through the whole History, against which any speech,
or any sequence of speeches, protests in vain. So there may be said
to obtain a further, deeper irony between momentary if tensely
reasoned arguments and silent, overriding motives. The Athenians
do not listen to Pericles when he recommends restraint about cam-
paigns, at his point of maximum prestige and maximum social
authority. "Your knowledge {linaTrinr)) is better than another force
that has good fortune {(iVTvxov(Tr]<^'' (VII. 63. 4). So Nicias says to
troops whose morale is low as the Sicilians are pressing them hard.
Not only does the disastrous outcome render these words ironic.
Thucydides' own principles do, since "knowledge," here meaning
military skill, ought to be sufficient to know that it will be a decisive
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factor only if other factors are equal. This is what Pericles had insisted
long before, weighing up the whole balance of factors, and there is
the irony that Nicias, who seems to be imitating Pericles, is inadequate
to his model. Of the factors that count, it is precisely strength or
force (pwjLiTj) and happenstance {tvxv) that figure large.
So particular is the narrative of Thucydides that it often stays close
to the maximum point of particularity. In its onward flow, however,
it pauses most notably for the speeches, which do not halt the action
but poise on the brink of futurity and decision. They themselves,
seen not as ruminations over the events but as themselves an event,
particularize still further. They are given not word by word as uttered,
but word by word to delineate the arguments presented. This makes
each clause, and sometimes each word, a microscopic encapsulation
of dialectical relations between particular and general. Their reference
is to a moment in an idea, and as such the terms in the speeches
present a double face. With respect to their referents they are
reconstructively concrete, and their character as signs must work
more actively just because the individual words are constructive
rather than reported. But the actual words are abstract with respect
to their lexical origin, and also with respect to their syntactic function.
Because of his onward flow, and his intermittent nervous adduction
of qualifying abstraction, Thucydides is not felt to be slipping from
particular to general, or from concrete to abstract. He can get back
again very fast. For this reason, as well as for those Finley gives, ^^ he
operates, in a sense, midway between the paratactic {Xe^Lq eLpofievr])
and the hypotactic or subordinate (Xe^iq KaTecrTpanixivr]). Actually,
even to describe him so may obscure the fact that the coordinates
on which he operates permit of the occasional combination of these
two styles, but not for their discrimination. His partial synecdoche
makes him always potentially a subordinator, but the stringing of one
event onto another in the narrative line pulls against this tendency.
To use Lloyd's terms for persistent tendencies in Greek thought,^^
Thucydides implicitly subsumes both the polarity that would make
him subordinate his particulars under a general heading and the
analogy which would make him coordinate them. Polarity and analogy
are readapted to the constantly testing linearity of his presentation.
In the sentences, frequent in his work, which seem to derive from,
and distort, the isocola formalized as stylistic desiderata by Gorgias,
the balances between clauses are almost always subverted. The feeling
** Finley, op. cit., pp. 253-69.
*^ G. E. L. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek
Thought (Cambridge 1966).
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given by Thucydides' wrenching style is of too much pressing upon
the sentence to be distributed out in even clauses. Only in the
tendentious argumentation of an advocate uttering a speech will they
be pressed into balance, or in the high piety and enthusiasm of
Pericles' Funeral Oration. And even in such instances the abstractions
brought into balance are themselves terms not usually polarized.
The compression of thinking into these terms individually shows
in their somewhat unusual contrast collectively. Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus takes Thucydides to task for a number of stylistic sleights. All
of these could be redescribed as distortions of language into imbalance
under pressure: the substitution of noun for verb and of verb for
noun; of active for passive and of passive for active; the change of
tenses; the frequent use of parentheses and involution; the substitution
of person for thing and thing for person. Dionysius speaks, too, of
Thucydides' enthymemes. These logical proofs with one term left
out will serve well to indicate the onward "slippage" of Thucydides'
demonstration.
As Wille says of Thucydides, "Formal analogies can cover actual
differences, while actual analogies are concealed in formal varia-
tions."^^ This happens especially when he is moving from more
particular to somewhat less, and from concrete description to abstract
reflection, as spectacularly in his transition to general observations
after the Corcyrean rebellion:
iraaa. re ib'ta KareaTr] Oavarov, Koi oCov ()>L\d iv too toiovtu yiypeadaL, ovdeu
OTi ov ^vve^T] Kot en Tzepairepw. kou. yap TraTtjp Tratda aireKTeii/e koi ccko T<hv
iepibu airea-rcuivro koi irpbq avTotq (kthvopto, oi be riveq Koi irtpioiKobonj]da>T€c,
ev Tov Aiovmov tw iepCb airedavov.
OijTwq wfiT] (^) CTamc, TTpovxoipriae, koH ebo^e p,ak\ov, bibri Iv Totq irpojTr}
iyeuero, eirel varepov ye koI irav coq eiTrelv to 'EXXrfVLKO' (kiptjOt}, 8ia4>opu}v
ovau}v eKaaTaxov Totq Te TCt)i> 8r}p,uv irpoaTaTaLc, Tovq 'Adrjvaiovc, eirayeadai Kai
Totq oXiyoLq TOvq AaKedaiixouiovq. koi ev fiev eiprjur) ovk ocv exbuToiv irpb(f)aaiu
ovd' eToijxoov TzapaKaXelv amovq, iroXenovu'evuiv 8e kol ^vufxaxioiq onia eKaTepoiq
Tfi tCjp evaPTiwp /caxaxrei kol a4>iaiv avTotq eK tov ovtov irpoairoifiaet paSiojq
at eiraydoyal Totq veu)Tepi^eLV ti ^ovXojxevoiq eiropi^ovTO. koi eireireae iroXXa kol
XOiXeira KaTa araaiv Toiq irbXeai.
Every form of death occurred, and as is wont to happen in such cases,
there was nothing that did not transpire and yet more extremely. Yes,
and father slew child, and people were dragged from the temples and
killed near them, and some were walled up and died in the temple of
Dionysus.
So the raw strife proceeded, and, because this was the first example
" Gunter Wille, "Zu Stil und Methode des Thukydides" (1963) in Hans Herter,
ed., op. at., p. 691.
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of it, it seemed even worse than it was; later, practically the whole of
the Greek world was stirred up, because in every state quarrels gave
occasion to the democratic leaders to ask for aid from Athens, to the
oligarchs to ask Sparta. In peace, without the excuse and indeed
without the readiness to summon them; but in war and with an alliance
at hand for either side, to injury for their enemies and to advantage
for themselves, inducements were easily furnished to those wishing to
innovate. Many were the calamities that befell the Greek states through
this civil strife. (III. 81.5-82.2: Gomme, revised)
Intermediate abstraction has already begun in the sentence about the
father kilhng the son. This is not one instance but a type case of
which there could have been more than one instance, though one
single salient instance of horror, the w^alling up of suppliants in the
temple of Dionysus, brings the sentence to its climax. The typification
of the first instance modifies the horror of the last, while the actuality
of the last instance concretizes the whole passage even further. There
is also a shift between singular and plural for the verb here, and for
"temple" {kpbv), though the cases are suspended differently between
particular and general.
The jump to much higher generalization in "raw strife" (d>/u^
crTaatg) reveals, and incorporates, the horror Thucydides controls
and compresses his diction while his syntax forces into extreme
torsions here. He goes on to describe another kind of slippage than
the one his mastery is enlisting, a slippage of diction:
iaraaia^e re ovv to. rdv irbXeciiu, koi ra e<l>vaTepi^0PTa irov Trvara tup
irpoyevoiiei'uv iroXv iirecpepe Tr)v VTrepPoXfjv tov KaivovaOai raq diavoiaq rdiv t'
i'inX'ti.py](Ji(jov Tztpnex^W^'- x^oti 't^^ Tip.(ji)piuv cxToiria. kol Tr)v auidvtap a^iuaiv
TU)v ovopoLTOiv iq TO. epya avTrjWa^av rfi diKaio^aei. roXpa /xev yap aXbyiaToq
audpda (t>LX(Taipoq iuopiadr], neXXtjaiq 8t Trpopr]dfiq deiXia evTpeirrjq, to 8e achcppof
TOV avoivbpov trpbax'lP'^y "^^^ '''o T^poq airap ^vveTOv eVt trap apyop.
So as the affairs of the cities kept going into revolt, the later outbreaks,
by knowledge of what had gone before were marked by ever-increasing
novelty of rationales, shown both in the ingenuity of attack and the
enormity of revenge. They changed the customary validation of terms
as men claimed the right to use them to suit the deeds: unreasoning
daring was termed loyal courage; prudent delay specious cowardice;
moderation the cloak of timidity; and understanding of the whole to
be in everything inactive. (82. 3: Gomme, revised)
"As men claimed the right to use them" translates the single term
dLKaiixxriq, "adjudication," a term usually applied to court actions, and
sometimes to the punishment assigned after judgment. All these
senses tinge Thucydides' use without modifying it. This word refuses
to refer to that which it describes and unwittingly exemplifies—the
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"judgers" are "judged" by Thucydides, and even self-punished by
destroying the use of the language to get them out of such later
enterprises as the Sicilian Expedition or the rule of the Four Hundred.
Under such stress, however, the language must respond by a corre-
sponding compactness and agility, as in this extraordinary case Thu-
cydides is exemplifying when he takes the fairly unimportant Cor-
cyrean rebellion as a typifying instance. When he gets to still bigger
and more crucial events, he cannot digress for so long.
The increasing pressure not to digress confines Thucydides' pres-
entational variation simply to relativizing his linear detail. Sometimes
he offers a great deal of detail, in campaigns important for the war
or for their emblematic force. Less often he scales down the amount
of detail he gives. We cannot be sure that his omission of speeches
in Book Eight indicates incompleteness and not the writer's decision
to foreshorten from this point on. Having been initiated to the
argumentative processes of speeches, the informed reader is in a
position to make do with summaries so as to move forward more
cogently.
The principle of relevance in the History operates simply at first;
every detail must relate to the one all-embracing war. But the History
starts out at a higher level of complexity and generality than the one
it maintains, since Thucydides delays his prefatory theoretical remarks
till after the "Archaeology" and delays the Pentekontaetia till after
the beginnings of conflict. The shifts from one to another of these
four initial units might tempt a critic to provide schematizations,^®
but the onward pressure of events will undo such large-scale structural
deductions. Thucydides cannot be found to have invented a structure
more complex than his implied rule of explaining only what time has
brought new to the conditions of the war. He could have built the
History, after all, on a version of Herodotus' more complex pattern,
the intertwining of distant with close time-frames and ethnographic
monographs with narratives. As it is, his narrative almost mimetically
changes course as the war changes course. The Olympian viewpoint
of the Archaeology and the Pentekontaetia cannot be brought in to
provide a Herodotus-like expansive disquisition about Persian politics
in Book Eight.
By that point Thucydides has established his theoretical control
over the factors governing the narrative. Those come as a gradual
revelation, and their increasing explicitness reinforces the simple but
^* Schadewaldt, op. cit., pp. 391-94. Schadewaldt diagrams the narrative according
to three foci of exposition, "Wesensdeutung," "Machtmotiv" and "Pathologie Athens."
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elusive near-pattern he is singlemindedly elaborating. The synecdoche
can only be partial, but its theoretical force holds.
Plato, and later Aristotle, devised categories that would solve
problems about the relation of general and particular. In the History
Thucydides offers an ongoing instantiation of how one kind of relation
evolves between general and particular through a complex temporal
sequence.
Brown University

